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I.

INTRODUCTION:

THEMES OF EXCLUSION

This article will discuss what the exclusion of particular groups
of people from the law has meant for the law. By exclusion I mean
exclusion from the making and practice of law-exclusion from the
profession. By law I mean the law in all its contexts-the making,
explication, interpretation, and practice of law. The story of law in
the United States is largely a story about one group of people, middle
to upper class white males (I shall call them the "lawmakers"), making law for all others in society. Some have called this the patriarchy
of law.' The rest of us are "lawreceivers."
My objective is to explore how some groups have been excluded
from the making and practice of law, what meaning that has for how
we see our laws, and most importantly, what new things we might
learn if the excluded were included. In short, I want to explore the
many ways of exclusion, the meaning of exclusion, and the hopes and
dilemmas of inclusion.
I will present three questions to consider. First, what are the
many ways of exclusion? Let us count the ways-there are many;
some are obvious, and others are more invidious because of their subtlety. Second, for those of us who have been excluded, what have we
learned from our exclusion? What is the "epistemology of exclu* Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles; A.B., 1971, Barnard College;
J.D., 1974, University of Pennsylvania. This article is based on the keynote address delivered
to the conference, Excluded Voices: Realities in Law and Law Reform, University of Miami
School of Law, February 6, 1986.
1. Polan, Toward a Theory of Law and Patriarchy,in THE POLITICS OF LAW 294 (D.
Kairys ed. 1982); Rifkin, Toward a Theory of Law and Patriarchy,3 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 83

(1980).
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sion"? A difficult wrinkle to this question is whether we know what
we know because of our exclusion-the underclass is forced to know
both its own world and the world of the oppressor. We need to be
multilingual, speaking white, male, objective tongues, while at the
same time speaking in black, brown, yellow, red, female, and subjective ones. Or, do excluded groups offer distinctive ways of knowing
that represent epistemologies able to survive inclusion and offer suggestions for broader knowledge of the legal world? Thus, there are
the questions of what we know, how we know it, and why we know
what we do. Finally, there is the important issue of whether we who
have been excluded will assimilate, or will we innovate when we enter
the world that has locked us out?
My discussion will focus on the feminist challenges to male
knowledge structures in the law because that is my own experience
and field of research.' There are now feminist approaches to law as
doctrine,3 law as theory,4 and law as practice.' Women who previously have been, and presently are being excluded, are constructing
legal reality in new ways. The tricky issue, of course, is whether the
legal system will include and be transformed by these new constructions or whether these constructions will be transmuted into a form
that the lawmakers control.
After reviewing some specific examples of the epistemology of
women's exclusion, I will offer a few words about the knowing that
2. See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, Women as Law Teachers: Toward the Feminization of
Legal Education, inESSAYS ON THE APPLICATION OF A HUMANISTIC PERSPECTIVE TO LAW
TEACHING 16 (1981); Menkel-Meadow, The ComparativeSociology of Women Lawyers.: The
Feminization of the Legal Profession, 24 OSGOODE HALL L.J. - (1987) [hereinafter MenkelMeadow, The Feminization of the Legal Profession]; Menkel-Meadow, Feminist Legal Theory,
CriticalLegal Studies and Legal Education: The "Fem-Crits" Go To Law School, 38 J. LEG.
ED. - (1988); Menkel-Meadow, Portia In A Different Voice: Speculations on a Women's
Lawyering Process, I BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39 (1985) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow,
Portia]; Menkel-Meadow, Women in Law? (Review Essay), 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 189

(reviewing C.

FUCHS EPSTEIN, WOMEN IN LAW

(1981)).

3. See, e.g., Kay, Models of Equality, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 39; Law, Rethinking Sex and
the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955 (1984); Minow, "Forming Underneath Everything
That Grows.' Toward A History of Family Law, 1985 WISC. L. REV. 819; Olsen, Statutory
Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEX. L. REV. 387 (1984); Wildman, The
Legitimation of Sex Discrimination: A Critical Response to Supreme Court Jurisprudence,63
OR. L. REV. 265 (1984); Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts.
and Feminism, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 175 (1982).
4. See, e.g., Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REV. (1987);
MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8
SIGNS 635 (1983); Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence. An Essay, 95 YALE L.J.
1373 (1986); F. Olsen, The Sex of Law (unpublished manuscript).
5. See Fox, Good-bye to Gameplaying, JURiS DR., Jan. 1978, at 37; see generally MenkelMeadow, Portia, supra note 2; Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives
From the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589 (1986).
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comes from other exclusions such as race and class, but will do so
cautiously. It has become too easy, I think, for those who have been
excluded by the "white male club" 6 to be lumped together in their
exclusions. One bit of knowledge we have gained from feminist
knowledge is the contextual particularity of our experiences. 7 So, I
will sketch some teachings from other exclusions, simply as suggestions and speculations for future work to be done on both the similarities and the differences in the various forms of exclusion we
experience in the law. We also must consider the new exclusions that
we are currently creating in order to think about how those will ultimately challenge our present schemas.
Our work will expose another exclusion-the epistemological
exclusions of the fields in which we work. Western knowledge is compartmentalized, organized by specialized knowing and "disciplines."
Lawmakers have looked for the meaning of law in doctrine, statutes,
and cases. Recently, we have come to understand that to know the
meaning of law we must look to other materials and fields: behavior,8
literary interpretation, 9 and experience.' 0 I will try to narrow the
exclusions of knowledge by drawing on some of the insights of behavioral andsocial science and by performing one of my favorite functions: translation from one community of knowers to another.
Our inquiry begins with exploring the subject of exclusion, using
a method of knowing that emerged from women's exclusion: the telling and sharing of experiences. I will discuss with you what I and
others think of exclusion. The following exercise will help us to
explore these issues experientially and conceptually.
Think about an experience you have had where you were
excluded from something in which you wanted to participate (e.g., a
club, an event, an institution) and your exclusion was based on some
criterion you had little ability to change (e.g., gender, race, religion,
class, ethnicity, age). Now ask yourself the following questions about
that experience:
1. What was the basis of your exclusion?
2. In what way were you excluded?
6. Littleton, supra note 4.
7. See, e.g., C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982).
8. In the works of law and social science, and law and economics, we see some efforts at
tracing the effect of law on behavior and the effects of lawmakers' behavior on the making of
law. See, e.g., L. FRIEDMAN & S. MACAULAY, LAW AND THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES
(1977).
9. See, e.g., Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J.
997 (1985); Minow, Law Turning Outward, TELos, Fall 1987.
10. See, e.g., S. ESTRICH, REAl. RAPE (1987).
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3. What did you know about the group/event you were trying to
join?
4. What did you know about yourself in that moment of
exclusion?
5. What did you learn about that gap or difference between yourself and the group?
6. How did you ultimately come to interpret that experience in
terms of its value to you in what you learned about yourself and
the other?

This was an experience of "excluded knowledge." Most of the
time when we experience these moments we assume the group we are
seeking to enter is the core, and is "where the action is."" This is
what sociologists would call the internalization of the dominant culture, a complex relationship of objective power and the subjective
experience of that domination, which results in our perception of the
"dominant" culture as legitimate and causes us to denigrate that
which is devalued by that dominant culture.12 For me, the significant
aspect of these experiences is their potential for breakthrough, transformation, epiphanies of knowledge, and change and contribution.
Let me share one personal experience that forms the experiential
backdrop of my scholarly work. As a trial lawyer for legal services, I
worked on many large institutional class actions that had the potential to bring about social change. I did this work in a culture I would
honestly describe as a "macho trial" culture. Lawyers were evaluated
by "winning" their cases (which they frequently accomplished by
moving for summary judgment instead of going to trial). I felt
excluded by this culture in several ways. First, it was predominantly
male. Second, I found it difficult to be aggressive and confrontational
when I frequently saw some of the other side's problems, such as lack
of funding. Third, I knew that "paper victories" did not solve the
underlying problem, as opposed to the legally constructed problem.
My attempts to negotiate and pursue other ways to resolve the issues
were regarded as too soft. To survive and to become well respected, I
reformed. By apprenticing myself to some hard-hitting lawyers who
taught me the tricks of the trade, I am able to report that when I left
legal services I was regarded by many as a "tough cookie." I appreciated this opportunity to broaden my repertoire of lawyering skills.
11. Except if we are like Groucho Marx and don't want to belong to any club that would
accept us as members. See J. BARTLETr, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 834 (1980).
12. See C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED-DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 3244 (1987) (application of internalization to women's experience at the hand of the dominant
legal culture); see generally Bumiller, Victims in the Shadow of the Law.: A Critique of the
Model of Legal Protection, 12 SIGNS 421 (1987).
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But when I began to teach and write I had trouble transmitting
this culture. It seemed inefficient, ineffective, and morally uncomfortable, and it ultimately prevented me from being who I wanted to be in
the world. Moreover, my students were not becoming what I wanted
them to be. So, to make a long story a bit shorter, I began to move
from that moment of feeling different and out of place to an exploration of whether there were other ways to be an effective lawyer. I
focused particularly on models of legal negotiation, learning a great
deal from social psychology, game theory, economics, and other disciplines.1 3 One of the things I learned was that the conventions of the
club I was trying to enter were remarkably narrow, short sighted, and
could in fact be demonstrated to be economically and mathematically
inefficient. Much of my intuition was supported by rigorous scholarship in other disciplines.' 4 Interestingly, I learned that other academic lawyers were doing similar work in reaction tQ the inadequacies
of the dominant legal culture, I which illustrates one of those wonderful moments in research efforts called convergence. The dominant
paradigms were showing their cracks, and those on the outside could
see more clearly the possibility of new ones. 16 For me, if there is a
moral to this story, it is not just that I gained new substantive knowledge about trials, legal negotiation, adversarial lawyering, integrative
solutions, and the dysfunctions of compromise,' 7 but rather that one
can come to see new ways of knowing through "exclusion" from the
core or normative culture.
Let me briefly illustrate with a few other examples of "excluded"
knowledge, before moving to the particularities of law. In what has
become a basic, though controversial text for feminist scholars, Carol
Gilligan illustrates in In A Different Voice is that much of what we
13. For more detailed accounts, see Menkel-Meadow, Legal Negotiation: A Study of
Strategiesin Search of Theory, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 905 [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow,
Legal Negotiation]; Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The
Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754 (1984) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow,
Toward Another View].

14. See Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View, supra note 13, at 756 n.2; see also H.
RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION (1982); R. LUCE & H. RAIFFA, GAMES
AND DECISIONS (1957); J. VON NEUMANN & 0. MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND
ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR (1947).
15. See supra notes 13 & 14; see generally R. FISHER & W. URY, GETrING TO YES (1981);
G. WILLIAMS, LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT (1983); Lowenthal, A General

Theory of Negotiation Process, Strategy, and Behavior, 31 U. KAN. L. REV. 69 (1982).
16. See generally T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962).

17. See Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View, supra note 13, at 783-93; see generally
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF POLITICAL. & LEGAL PHILOSOPHY, COMPROMISE IN ETHICS, LAW-

AND POLITICS (1979); Menkel-Meadow, Legal Negotiation, supra note 13.
18. C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982).
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thought we knew about developmental psychology and moral reasoning (in the works of Piaget,' 9 Erickson 2' and Kohlberg2 1 ) was based
exclusively on male subjects. Thus, although we may know about
male development, we have yet to learn much about human
development.
Similarly, much of the debate about the work of Margaret
Mead 22 and Derek Freeman 23 in Samoa has to do with the anthropologist'spointe de vue. Freeman claims to have seen the "true" story of
violence and sex in Samoa because he studied chiefs and the male
power structure. Mead's informants were adolescent girls and
women, a particularly relevant portion of the Samoan culture, given
24
the substantive issues of debate, "coming of age," and adolescence.
In yet another example I recently learned from black feminist
Bell Hooks, psychologist Rollo May was confronted with interesting
data showing that black children who had been abandoned by their
mothers were better adjusted than white children who had been abandoned by their mothers. This finding seemed contrary to the conventional hypotheses. 25 The apparent reason for this contradiction was
that black children were socialized to expect less and thus had more
realistic apprehensions about life in our cruel world, where ultimately
we all are "abandoned" by our parents.
The common thread of these examples is that "truth" may be
found with the statistical "outliers," that the margin may be the core,
the periphery may be the center, and the excluded may be the
included. At the very least, the truth as we know it may be much
more multifaceted than the "included" are willing to acknowledge.
Previously excluded voices, by providing innovation and change, can
counteract the stagnation and bankruptcy of the status quo. As sociologist Digby Baltzell has written, the strength of the "Protestant
Establishment" is in its willingness to accept and adapt to innovation
from new immigrant groups. 26 Thus, we, the "immigrants" of exclusion, can offer new ways of knowing.
In many academic disciplines, fields have expanded to include
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

See, e.g., J. PIAGET, THE CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY IN THE CHILD (1954).
See, e.g., E. ERIKSON, IDENTITY AND THE LIFE CYCLE (1959).
See, e.g., L. KOHLBERG, ESSAYS ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT (1981).
M. MEAD, COMING OF AGE IN SAMOA (1961).
D. FREEMAN, MARGARET MEAD AND SAMOA (1983).

24. M. MEAD, supra note 22 (crudely stated, a study of the relative importance of nature
and nurture effects on culture).
25. Address by Professor Bell Hooks, Tenth Annual Critical Legal Studies Conference,
Los Angeles, California (Jan. 7, 1987) (citing R. MAY, THE COURAGE TO CREATE 56-63
(1975)).
26. E. BALTZELL, THE PROTESTANT ESTABLISHMENT (1964).
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women and workers, not just men and kings. This expansion of
knowledge, such as new family forms in sociology 27 and even new
theologies in religion,28 demonstrates that we learn so much more by
including new perspectives and new knowers who are beginning to
find their voices.
Let us now explore, more concretely, how previous and present
exclusions from the legal profession offer the promise of more varied
ways of knowing and of potentially more mellifluous voices of lawmaking and law practice. We also must explore some of the continuing and new dangers that may result from excluding voices.

II.

EXCLUSIONS FROM LAWMAKING

There are many ways to exclude, such as refusing admission to
the club, admitting but not listening to the new members, admitting
but segregating or marginalizing, and finally, transmuting or translating the words of those excluded into the terms and definitions of the
included. All of these strategies have been deployed to exclude
women, and others, from the legal profession.
The most obvious exclusion in our history has been simple nonacceptance and nonadmission. History tells us of several early
attempts of women to perform lawyering functions-Margaret Brent
in seventeenth century colonial Maryland,29 Caroline Norton in early
nineteenth century England,3" and black slave Elizabeth Freeman
who argued her own cause of emancipation in a Massachusetts court
in 1783.7 Yet the most familiar of these is the case of exclusion
decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1873, affirming
the decision to deny Myra Bradwell admission to the Illinois Bar.3
Justice Bradley concurred in the judgment with the now infamous
words and thoughts of his time:
[T]he civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a
wide difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and
woman. Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender.
The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the
female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil
life. The constitution of the family organization, which is founded
27. See Epstein, Women in Sociological Analysis: New Scholarship Versus Old Paradigms,
in A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE IN THE ACADEMY 149 (E. Langland & W. Gove, eds. 1981).
28. See Ruether, The Feminist Critique in Religious Studies, in A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE
IN THE ACADEMY, supra note 27, at 63-66.
29. K. MORELLO, THE INVISIBLE BAR
30. M. FORSTER, SIGNIFICANT SISTERS
31. K. MORELLO, supra note 29, at 8.

3-8 (1986).
15-52 (1984).

32. Bradwell v. The State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873).
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in the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates
the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain
and functions of womanhood. The harmony, not to say identity, of
interests and views which belong, or should belong, to the family
institution is .repugnant to the idea of a woman adopting a distinct
and independent career from that of her husband. So firmly fixed
was this sentiment in the founders of the common law that it
became a maxim of that system of jurisprudence that a woman had
no legal existence separate from her husband, who was regarded as
her head and representative in the social state; and, notwithstanding some recent modifications of this civil status, many of the special rules of law flowing from and dependent upon this cardinal
principle still exist in full force in most States. One of these is, that
a married woman is incapable, without her husband's consent, of
making contracts which shall be binding on her or him. This very
incapacity was one circumstance which the Supreme Court of Illinois deemed important in rendering a married woman incompetent
fully to perform the duties and trusts that belong to the office of an
attorney and counsellor.33
Let us dissect this decision. The actual holding of the case, based
on an interpretation of the privileges and immunities clause of the
Constitution of the United States, decided that the practice of law,
regulated by the states, was not a federally protected privilege. 4 In
Justice Bradley's concurrence, we can see the conventions of his day
that precluded women from practice: the assumptions that they
belonged in the home caring for their husbands and children, that
husbands could not and should not bear the competition of a wife's
separate and independent career, and that the doctrine of coverture
prohibited married women from making and enforcing their own contracts, including retainer agreements with clients.3 " Justice Bradley
alludes to the Married Women's Property Acts,36 which began to
alter married women's legal rights and thus gradually erode legal
impediments to the practice of law. But it is clear from this opinion
that even legalisms should defer to the "nature" of things and the
"divine ordinance." Thus, from a strictly legal perspective, only married women should have been barred from the practice of law, even
though by 1873 most married women could have been able to perform
lawyering duties legally.
33. Id. at 141 (emphasis added) (Bradley, J., concurring).
34. Id. at 139. See generally Olsen, From False Paternalism to False Equality. Judicial
Assaults on Feminist Community, Illinois 1869-1895, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1518 (1986).
35. Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 139-42 (Bradley, J., concurring).
36. Id. at 142; see Chused, Married Women's Property Law: 1800-1850, 71 Gio. L.J.
1359, 1384-1423 (1983).
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The legal doctrines that excluded women were, of course, made
by men. The doctrine of coverture at common law, the interpretation
of Illinois state law and the federal Constitution's privileges and
immunities clause were all constructed by male legislators, male constitutional founding fathers, and male judges and justices. Thus the
laws that set forth the rules governing admission to the profession
were created by those who sought to keep out the subject of the regulations and legislation, without, of course, this latter group's
participation.
Even more important to the underlying structures of the exclusion, however, are the sociological constructs underneath the legal
interpretations: Women belong at home, they are too timid and delicate to compete in the man's world, and the family will suffer if
women enter the market.37
Let us now contrast this nineteenth century story created by
male lawmakers with the real Myra Bradwell. Mrs. Bradwell taught
herself law, by reading law with her husband who was a judge in
Cook County, Illinois. She took and passed the 1869 Chicago Bar
Exam. Prior to taking the bar exam, Mrs. Bradwell began publishing
the Chicago Legal News, the first law newspaper published in the midwest. She wrote on issues of social and legal reform, including
women's suffrage. When the famous Chicago fire destroyed much of
downtown Chicago, the Chicago Legal News was still written, published and distributed, all by the hard work of Mrs. Bradwell.
Eventually women in Illinois and elsewhere were admitted to the
bar, not by court action, but by active campaigns of legislative lobbying. Bradwell was eventually admitted to the bar in 1890, almost
twenty years after legislation was finally passed. By the way, Mrs.
Bradwell also raised a son and a daughter, both of whom became lawyers. The next female applicant to the Illinois Bar was single, but she
too was denied admission. The court hearing her subsequent challenge concluded that because there had been no women lawyers in
England, the Illinois legislature could not have intended to include
women in the United States.3 8
So that you can put the sociological assumptions in perspective,
let me tell you briefly about some of the other early women lawyers in
the United States. Their amusing, inspiring, and poignant tales were
37. See
Reform, 96
38. See
WOMEN IN

generally Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal
HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983).
K. MORELLO, supra note 29, at 20-21; From Colonial Times to the New Deal, in I
AMERICAN LAW 215-16 (M. Wortman ed. 1985).
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recently told by Karen Berger Morello in The Invisible Bar.3 9 Mary
Gissen Leonard, the first woman lawyer in both Oregon and Washington, married a Portland innkeeper whom she later divorced. Her
husband was found dead several weeks after he was to have paid her
maintenance in accordance with a marital settlement agreement, and
Mary was charged with his murder. After almost a year, much of it
spent in jail, Mary Leonard was brought to trial and acquitted. She
moved to Seattle and apprenticed to a lawyer. She eventually gained
admittance to both the Washington and Oregon Bars, where she was
known as something of an eccentric. She drank heavily, was known
to use physical force and it was said she ran a combination hotel/
bordello in Portland. She was arrested at least four times, all while
she was practicing law.4" Such is the timidity and delicacy of a
woman!
In California, Clara Shortridge Foltz sued the Hastings College
of Law, seeking admission to the school after the administration
refused to permit her to attend classes. Having won that battle, she
went on to a criminal defense and legislative lobbying practice, in
which she is credited with having created the California parole and
public defender systems.4 ' Although these fields would seem the least
suited to women's "delicacy and timidity," Foltz became interested in
them because indigents were not receiving legal aid from the exclusively male bar. Social and legal reform became her m6tier.
Lyda Conley, our nation's first female native American lawyer,
learned in 1904 that the United States Department of Interior was
planning to destroy her tribal burial ground.42 While Ms. Conley
studied for the bar exam, she and her sister occupied the burial
grounds in Kansas, armed with guns and placards. Her combination
of legal and protest tactics did not lead to victory in court, but to a
land deal protecting the cemetery, after the public attention garnered
by her protest activities caused embarrassment to the federal
government.43
I could tell many more such stories, uncovering the lost histories
of the women who pioneered entrance to and practice at the bar.
Whether by working in quiet law offices, assisting their husbands, or
undertaking more audacious social reform practices (many of the
39. K. MORELLO, THE INVISIBLE BAR (1986).
40. Id. at 27-31.
41. Id. at 65. See generally Schwartz, Brandt & Milrod, The Battles of Clara Shortridge

Foltz, 1985

CAl.. DEFENDER

7.

42. K. MORELLO, supra note 29, at 123-24.
43. Lyda Conley lost her legal case after argument to the Supreme Court of the United
States. See Conley v. Ballinger, 216 U.S. 84 (1910).
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nation's first women lawyers were activists in the movement for suffrage4 4 ) these women, by their very existence, challenged the dominant knowledge structures.
In sociological terms, women challenged the dominant conception of womanhood in one of two ways: Either they failed to conform
to traditional notions about the appropriate role and passivity of
women by being activist, ambitious, and strong lawyers, or they challenged the conventions of what it meant to be a lawyer, defined exclusively in male terms. Thus, the "status-set typing"4 5 that equates
male qualities with competent lawyering skills simply because males
have been the principal occupants of the lawyer's role, fails to permit
a broader, and perhaps more effective description of lawyers' tasks. It
has failed to include those qualities stereotypically associated with
women (e.g., caring for clients, peacemaking) and those qualities that
come from exclusion, such as concern for other excludeds (the indigent and underrepresented), and the more demanding tactics (social
protest) that, in concert with legal tactics women used to achieve
admission to the bar and participate in legal reform.
The common theme emanating from these stories mandates that
we confront and change either our stereotypic view of the excluded
(women) or the stereotypic conception of what it means to be
included (to be a lawyer, and therefore to be a male lawyer). The
early experiences of exclusion and eventual inclusion taught women
to create new legal arguments, new legal tactics, and new forms of
legal practice and law reform. Women responded to their exclusion
by seeking innovative ways to gain admittance to the profession and
change its composition. The act of seeking admission to the legal profession caused women to become effective advocates in both the
courts and legislatures.46 The entrance of women forced both law
practice and legal doctrine to expand into areas and methods that
were new and broadening to the profession.4 7
44. See, e.g., Equality and the Best Form of Protection: The Political Strategy of Suffrage,

in

WOMEN IN AMERICAN LAW,

supra note 38, at 148.

45. " 'Status-set typing' occurs when a class of persons shares statuses (that is, certain
statuses tend to cluster [such as white, male and legal professional]) and when it is considered
appropriate that they do so." C. FUCHS EPSTEIN, WOMAN'S PLACE 87 (1970).
46. See R. CHESTER, UNEQUAL ACCESS (1985). The notion that women had to
"innovate" or "create" new modes of practicing professions is not unique to law. In a recent
book, historians Penina Glazer and Miriam Slater have documented the strategies of women's
entrance to a number of male dominated professions: college teaching, medicine, science, and
psychiatric social work. P. GLAZER & M. SLATER, UNEQUAL COLLEAGUES 14 (1987)
(suggesting that innovation is only one of several choices; the others are super-performance,
subordination and separatism).
47. See Menkel-Meadow, Portia, supra note 2, at 57; Schneider, supra note 5, at 601-04.
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Lest you think the struggles are over, let us explore some of the
more subtle and modern forms of exclusion. Though some claim
women have now entered the legal profession in large numbers4 8 such
that they constitute about 15% of practicing lawyers and close to
35% of all American law students, 4 9 the entrance has been sufficiently
recent, and women are still found disproportionately in the lower
reaches of the profession. They serve more often as associates than
partners, in the public rather than private sector, and in particular
fields of specialization. Women, for example, are less likely to be
found practicing corporate law.5 0
In research that I have been doing on the comparative sociology
of women lawyers-looking at women lawyers in a variety of civil and
common law countries-these patterns are sadly repeated. Analysis
of international data reveals that women are working in virtually all
spheres of legal practice. But in each individual country, women arie
clustered in particular occupations and particular tasks that are, not
surprisingly, the least valued forms of legal practice in that particular
culture. There is widespread occupational segregation and segmentation-a slightly more subtle form of exclusion. In Germany, for
example, women are found disproportionately in the jurist corps
working as judges or judges in training, just as these civil service jobs
are becoming more scarce and jobs in the private commercial sphere
are becoming more lucrative.5 1 In Belgium, by contrast, where there
are fewer judges and the judge's role is more prestigious, women are
less likely to be found. 2 One of the most interesting aspects of this
research is to study the differential in women's participation as trial
lawyers in countries with different values regarding the importance of
public litigation. In Norway, where being a trial lawyer is thought to
require "aggressive defiance," there are comparatively few women.
Yet in western European countries, where private commercial activity
is most valued, women will be found as public magistrates and advocates, a task considered more ministerial and bureaucratic.53 In virtually all countries women are more likely to be providing legal
48. See C. FUCHS EPSTEIN, WOMEN IN LAW 21 (1981); Curran, American Lawyers in the
1980's." A Profession in Transition, 20 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 19, 42-49 (1986).
49. C. FUCHS EPSTEIN, supra note 48, at 53.
50. B. CURRAN, K. ROSICH, C. CARSON & M. PUCCETTI, THE LAWYER STATISTICAL
REPORT: A STATISTICAL PROFILE OF THE U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE 1980'S, at 38-50

(1985); see generally L. VOGT, CAREER PATHS STUDY (1987).
51. See Blankenburg & Schultz, German Advocates, in LAWYERS IN SOCIETY - (P. Lewis
& R. Abel eds. 1988); Menkel-Meadow, The Feminization of the Legal Profession, supra note 2.
52. Huyse, Legal Experts in Belgium, in LAWYERS IN SOCIETY, supra note 51; MenkelMeadow, The Feminization of the Legal Profession, supra note 2.
53. Menkel-Meadow, The Feminization of the Legal Profession, supra note 2.
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assistance to the indigent, and as such their salaries are low and their
working conditions are poor. 4
I could go on citing more statistics and describing more patterns,
but let me instead identify the themes of exclusion that are raised
here. A push-pull effect pushes women into spheres where men will
not tread, although some argue that women are pulled into those
fields for which they have a "natural affinity": domestic relations,
estate work, and criminal defense. The practice of criminal law provides an interesting contradiction, in terms of exclusion. Women do
criminal defense work because men do not want to. Yet it is the very
work least suited to women's "natural timidity and delicacy," yielding
harsh language, bad working conditions in jailhouse interviews, night
courts, overcrowded offices, long hours, and arduous court battles.
Those who want to exclude for their own purposes give us the very
stereotypes that exclude. By analyzing the lines that exclude and by
exposing the logical gaps, we see that lines that exclude serve the particular political purposes of the line drawers. Occupational sociology
is filled with stories of gender changes in the composition of the work
force as the prestige of the task changed. Such is the case with clerical
workers, bank tellers, and telephone operators.55
The patterns of exclusion also reveal more problematic issues.
Are some clusters the product of preference rather than discrimination? A lawsuit filed by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission against Sears, Roebuck56 illustrates this dilemma, which
embroiled feminist historians.5
Were women discriminatorily
excluded from high commission sales work because men needed these
jobs to support their families, or did women self-select out of them to
avoid having to use more aggressive sales tactics or because they were
too busy with home duties to be ambitious at work? Note that these
questions are based on the assumption that aggressive sales tactics are
what is necessary to sell big ticket items because those are tactics currently used by men in those positions. Notice as well the irony that
the "big ticket" items are frequently "women's products," such as
refrigerators, washers and dryers, and other house appliances.
Women have been excluded in more painful ways, such as their
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., WOMEN AND WORK (R. Kahn-Hut, A. Daniels & R. Colvard eds. 1982);
WOMEN, WORK & PROTEST (R. Milkman ed. 1985).
56. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 628 F. Supp.
1264 (N.D. I11. 1986).
57. Kessler-Harris, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Sears Roebuck and
Company: A PersonalAccount,35 RADICAL HIST. REV. 57, 57-65 (1986); Milkman, Women's
History and the Sears Case, 12 FEMINIST STUD. 375, 375 (1986).
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work being exploited and used but not fully credited. This is true in
the case of reformer Josephine Goldmark, who contributed to the
famous "Brandeis brief" by meticulously collecting data and writing,
but not arguing in the Supreme Court.5" In more recent times,
women have been used to defend against sex discrimination suits such
as in the Sears5 9 case and in the recent case of California Federal
Savings and Loan Association v. Guerra,6" as if their female presence

on the defense side would refute the claims that their clients had discriminated against women.
More problematic in everyday exclusions are the ways in which
outsiders speak and are not heard or instead are forced to assimilate
into the culture of the included in order to succeed. In interviews I
have been conducting with women lawyers, I hear of women trying to
innovate or at least broaden the values and methods of law practice
only to be urged to conform to the norms of their workplaces.
Women who dislike the combative nature of litigation 6 1 more often
seek the healing methods of alternative dispute resolution. 61 Also,
there are women who seek to have law firms focus on issues such as
quality of work in addition to money and the bottom line.63 In other
tales that I have heard, women who succeed in joining the managing
committee of their law firm feel compelled to act like "one of the
boys" in order to be heard. In the parlance of feminist scholarship
and politics, women must learn to speak in many voices---in essence,
to be bilingual in order to be heard. Women must also learn to act
like men, for example, by not having children, at least until after partnership.65 These are some of the ways exclusion occurs. What does
such exclusion produce?
58. See B. BABCOCK, A. FREEDMAN, E. NORTON & S. Ross, SEX DISCRIMINATION AND

THE LAW 29 (1975) [hereinafter B. BABCOCK].

59. See Milkman, supra note 57, at 376; Kessler-Harris, supra note 57, at 7.
60. 107 S.Ct. 683 (1987).
61. Fox, supra note 5, at 38.
62. See, e.g., Steptoe & Johnson PartnerChooses to Specialize in ADR, 4 ALTERNATIVES
TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIGATION 5 (1986); cf. Rifkin, Mediation From A Feminist
Perspective. Promise and Problems, 2 LAW & INEQUALITY 21 (1984).
63. See J. ABRAMSON & B. FRANKLIN, WHERE THEY ARE Now, THE STORY OF THE
WOMEN OF HARVARD LAW 1974, at 1-20 (1986).
64. See, e.g., R. LAKOFF, LANGUAGE AND WOMAN'S PLACE (1975); cf Feminist
Discourse,Moral Values, and the Law-A Conversation, 34 BUFFALO L. REV. 11, 41-42 (1985)
(Carol Gilligan commented that women conform to society by using both male and female

types of reasoning.).
65. See J. ABRAMSON & B. FRANKLIN, supra note 63, at 165.
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EXCL UDED VOICES
THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF EXCLUSION: WHAT WE LEARN
FROM BEING OUTSIDE

My point is that we, the excluded, should learn from our exclusion that our insights and ways of doing things are valuable and can
be transformative. Feminist work in a number of disciplines has challenged the meaning of objectivity and neutrality in all of our epistemologies.66 One of the major intellectual themes of the twentieth
century is the recognition that the knower or observer is part of the
knowledge or observation.67 Thus, feminism has asked us to question
everything68 as we recognize that what we know has largely been
imposed on us as "truth" by a particular class of truth creators and
interpreters.
Given the feminist challenge to male jurisprudence and practice,
it is important to keep two caveats about "women's knowing" in mind
before we explore some particular new ways of feminist knowing
about law. The first is a point often made by feminist legal scholar
Catherine MacKinnon.69 Epistemologies based on exclusion may not
be our own, in the sense that we may truly possess them.7" I argue
below that women express concerns about care, connection, relationship, and empathy for the other. We must remember, however, that
care, connection, and relationship are what women may need to be
connected to the men who provide literal as well as figurative lifelines.
Thus the knowing that comes from exclusion is based not on intrinsic
characteristics, but rather on perverse oppositional knowledge that
may be necessary for survival and adaptation to exclusion. The parallels to exclusions based on race and class should therefore be obvious.
My own view on this topic is close to Simone de Beauvoir's who said
"patience is one of those feminine qualities which have their origin in
our oppression but should be preserved after our liberation."'" Exclusions may produce particular characteristics that are not truly our
own, but if we think of them as worthwhile, we should not totally
reject them simply because they were borne of our oppression.
A different problem of creating knowledge from exclusion arises
from the difficulties of tokenism. Sociologists have learned, particu66. See generally A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE IN THE ACADEMY, supra note 27; S.
HARDING, THE SCIENCE QUESTION IN FEMINISM (1986).
67. See, e.g., P. BERGER & T. LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY

(1966).
68. See. e.g., A. RICH, ON LIES, SECRETS, AND SILENCE (1979); Littleton, supra note 4.
69. Menkel-Meadow, Portia,supra note 2, at 42 n.19; Feminist Discourse, supra note 64, at
20-21 (comments of Catherine MacKinnon).
70. See generally C. MACKINNON, supra note 12.
71. S. DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX 153 (1974).
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larly in the law school context, that excluded groups that are few in
number and are very visible achieve less and are more conventional
and assimilationist in their work.7 2 The larger the numbers, the
greater the likelihood that previously excluded groups will perform
well, both in terms of traditional achievement and in their ability to
innovate. Thus, achieving a critical mass of previously excluded people may be essential to promoting the sort of transformative practices
I will now describe.
Formerly excluded women now working as feminist scholars
have challenged the teachings of virtually every discipline-from
anthropology to literary criticism, from religion to "hard" science.7 3
In law, this revolution in what we know is called feminist jurisprudence.7 4 In the space allotted here I cannot review all of the ways that
new voices have challenged our knowing about the law; I will review a
few with an emphasis on how the entrance of new, previously
excluded female lawmakers has affected our use and practice of law.
A recent study by several psychologists argues that women come
to know in ways different from men and in different styles, based on
their family experiences and life experiences, and formal education.75
"Received knowers" depend on authority and listening to others or to
subjective selves.76 "Procedural knowers" come to understand different methods of knowing, including reason, in addition to the difference in different perspectives. They experience empathy-the ability
to know through the eyes of the other.77 Finally, "constructed knowers" are able to integrate the knowledge of inside subjective experience with outside paradigms.7" Thus, constructed knowers "let the
inside out and the outside in" 79 and know that "all knowledge is constructed and the knower is an intimate part of the known."8 0 This
study of women's knowing, when read in connection with the work of
psychologists and educators Carol Gilligan, 8 Nel Noddings,"2 and
72. E.g., Spangler, Gordon & Pipkin, Token Women: An Empirical Test of Kanter's
Hypothesis, 84 AM. J. Soc. 160 (1978) (finding that women law students did not perform as
well in law schools where they were found in small token numbers).
73. See generally A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE IN THE ACADEMY, supra note 27.
74. See supra notes 3 & 4.
75. See, e.g., M. BELENKY, B. CLINCHY, N. GOLDBERGER & J. TARULE, WOMEN'S
WAYS OF KNOWING (1986) [hereinafter M. BELENKY].
76. Id. at 35-51.
77. Id. at 87-130.
78. Id. at 131-54.
79. Id. at 135.
80. Id. at 137.
81. C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982).
82. N. NODDINGS, CARING (1984).
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Ann Schaef 3 tells us that women may come to apprehend reality in
different ways or ask different questions of reality. 4
I have been a part of a group of legal scholars that has asked how
women's knowledge might contribute to different ways of reconfiguring the legal system. In my own work I have explored the possibility
of less adversarial modes of dispute resolution, such as problem solving, negotiation," and mediation,"6 which flow both from conventional stereotypes such as women's fear of conflict, and from the more
affirmative desire to care for the other and to see legal problems
within the greater social context.8 7 There is evidence, albeit limited,
that suggests that women are seeking justice through healing."' The
ethic of care and responsibility described in Carol Gilligan's work 9
has obvious implications for client relations and empathy, in contrast
to the male conceived professional distance taught in legal and medical interviewing courses.90 Thus, we may come to challenge the most
deeply rooted paradigms of law-the adversary system as we know it
and its professional dominance of and distance from the client. I am
not suggesting that all women behave in this way or challenge these
notions, but rather, that as the excluded find themselves chafing at the
knowledge systems created by men, the varied voices of the previously
excluded will express more porousness, more questioning, and more
ways to do things.
Feminist jurisprudence and an increase in women's voices in the
law have challenged legal doctrine as well. I have suggested that the
liberty interest in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services9 might
have been interpreted differently if women had construed liberty to
include the right to be connected to one's child, not just the right to be
83. A. SCHAEF, WOMEN'S REALITY (1981).
84. M. BELENKY, supra note 75, at 95-99 (citing M. DALY, BEYOND GOD THE FATHER
(1973)).
85. See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, Legal Negotiation,supra note 13; Menkel-Meadow, Toward
Another View, supra note 13.
86. See, e.g. Menkel-Meadow, Portia, supra note 2; see also Weingarten & Douvan, Male
and Female Visions of Mediation, I NEGOTIATION J. 349 (1985).
87. See C. GILLIGAN, supra note 18, at 24-62; Feminist Discourse, supra note 64, at 49-60
(comments of Carrie Menkel-Meadow).
88. See generally Pipkin & Rifkin, The Social Organization in Alternative Dispute
Resolution: Implications for Professionalization of Mediation, 9 JUST. SYs. J. 204 (1984)
(finding that mediators were more likely to be women in both private and publicly sponsored
mediation programs); Weingarten & Douvan, supra note 86.
89. See C. GILLIGAN, supra note 18, at 62-63.
90. See Klass, Bearing a Child in Medical School, N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1984, § 6
(Magazine), at 120; HERS 246-49 (N. Newhouse ed. 1986).
91. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
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"free" from governmental interference.92 Men also have interpreted
women's voices. My colleague Ken Karst has proffered suggestions
about how women's voices might "modify" 9' 3 interpretations of the
Constitution, and Paul Spiegelman suggests that "sharing" jobs might
be one way of resolving difficult issues in affirmative action.9 4
The recently decided case of CaliforniaFederalSavings and Loan
Association v. Guerra95 provides an example where one can hear
excluded voices effecting lawmaking. The legal issue in California
Federal was whether a California statute that required employers to
grant unpaid leaves of up to four months to pregnant workers was
inconsistent with the the Pregnancy Discrimination Act,9 6 a federal
civil rights law that provides, in effect, that pregnancy cannot be
treated differently from other disabilities. This was a case in which
the feminist legal community divided into several approaches based
on jurisprudences of either "neutral equality" for the sexes, 97 a "special exception for pregnancy" only, 98 or a broader view of "accommodating and recognizing real differences in the law so that difference[s]
won't have legal or social costs." 99 The real political issue boiled
down to the fear that if women were treated differently and if they
were legally recognized as different, this difference would be used
against women, as was perceived to be the case in protective labor
legislation. 11o
92. Menkel-Meadow, Portia,supra note 2, at 61-62; see also Sherry, The Gender of Judges,
4 LAW & INEQUALITY 159, 163-64 (1986).
93. Karst, Woman's Constitution, 1984 DUKE L.J. 447, 449. Note that Karst says
"modify" as if to include within the presently constructed system rather than to "transform"
and change completely-a noble, but still "male" effort to see women's contribution to
potential legal change.
94. Spiegelman, Court-OrderedHiring Quotas After Stotts: A Narrative on the Role of the
Moralities of the Web and the Ladder in Employment DiscriminationDoctrine, 20 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 339 (1985).
95. 107 S. Ct. 683 (1987).
96. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982). In many states, including California, it may have been
possible for the employer to have no disability benefits for employees, thus pregnancy becomes,
in the words of the objectors, "privileged" or "specially protected."
97. See Williams, supra note 3, at 190-200; see also Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy
and the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 325
(1985); Taub, Book Review, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1686 (1980) (reviewing C. MACKINNON,
SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979)).
98. See e.g., Finley, TranscendingEquality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and the
Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118 (1986); Kay, Equality and Difference. The Case
of Pregnancy, I BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. .1 (1985); Kay, supra note 3; see also Law, supra
note 3, at 1007.
99. Littleton, supra note 4; see also E. WOLGAST, EQUALITY AND THE RIGHTS OF
WOMEN (1980); Minow, Learning to Live With the Dilemma of Difference: Bilingual and
Special Education, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 157 (1985).
100. The debates and issues about the effects of protective labor legislation are actually
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For me, the role that now-included voices played in this legal
debate makes it historically different from previous legal episodes.
First, the parties and numerous amici developed the legal arguments
through information supplied by women lawmakers and writers. I0 1
Second, I joined an argument written by, among others, my colleague
Chris Littleton. We suggested that there were many ways to frame
the issue. Specifically, the constitutionally recognized right to procreate was available to men who could have children and suffer no loss of
employment opportunity, but it was less available to women who, if
they had children, might lose their jobs. 102 Thus, it is the interaction
of procreation and employment rights (which are necessarily connected in our modern world) that causes the problem, and a simple
focus on employment rights alone will not yield a resolution. The
notion of "equality" itself needs reconstructing 1 3 when conceptualized in terms of the interaction and inevitable interplay of work life
and family life, a recurrent theme in feminist jurisprudence." ° The
role that women played in arguing to transform the legal constructs
by unpacking them and making their complexities felt in the realities
of how they are experienced by the acted upon (pregnant workers),
illustrates the potential for new voices transforming the legal constructs with which we work. The arguments were derived from the
experience of pregnant workers having to choose between work and
procreation, and thus suggested a transformation of legal categories.
The "creative" moment here is in not necessarily assimilating the
arguments of already existing categories, such as "disability" or
"work versus family."
Third, there was, and is, a woman on the Supreme Court. I don't
want to make too much of this, as Professor Suzanna Sherry has in
arguing that Sandra Day O'Connor has demonstrated a particular
"feminine jurisprudence."' 1 5 One token woman will not necessarily
transform the Supreme Court but it does add another voice that may
quite complicated when put in their historical context. See, e.g., B. BABCOCK, supra note 58,
passim; DuBois, supra note 6; Olsen, supra note 34, at 1540; K. Sklar, Florence Kelley and the
Female World of Progressive Reform (unpublished manuscript).
101. Brief for Amicus Curiae, California Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 107 S. Ct.
683 (1987) (No. 85-494) (briefs filed by, inter alia, Coalition for Reproductive Equality in the
Workplace (CREW), American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), Women's Law Project, and
Women's Legal Defense Fund).
102. Brief for Amicus Curiae, California Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 107 S. Ct.
683 (1987) (No. 85-495) (brief filed on behalf of Coalition for Reproductive Equality in the
Workplace (CREW)).
103. See Littleton, supra note 4.
104. See e.g., S.EVANS, PERSONAL POLITICS (1979); Olsen, supra note 37.
105. Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 72 VA. L.
REV. 543, 543-44 (1986).
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be heard. Male jurists may become more sensitive to what they do
and may bestow upon women's legal groups the attention of someone
who must listen to them.
In addition, and perhaps most important to me, the debates
about the dangers of "special treatment" occur in a different historic
and political context than the earlier debates about protective labor
legislation.' 16 Throughout the CaliforniaFederal litigation women's
legal strategy groups discussed which legal arguments would be
appropriate. Even in the heat of their disagreements, they continued
to meet. 0 7 With women lawyers appearing on all sides of the case
and with a greater participation of women in the debate,' whatever
the dangers of a "difference" approach, more women as lawmakers
will now participate in the ongoing process of lawmaking and remaking (though clearly, still not enough).
Finally, the substantive issue itself, the relation of family to
work, is one of the crucial issues placed on the legal agenda by feminist lawyers, whether through litigation or pleas to transform parental
leave policies in law firms. 0 9 Congresswoman Patricia Schroeder has
introduced legislation to provide parental and dependency leave for
all workers" 0 (to bring us to conformity with most other western
industrial nations"'), and following California Federal, there is talk
of legislation to extend leaves to all workers who need to care for
children or other dependents. Thus, the California Federal story is
rich with legal transformations effected by the concerns of voices previously excluded from the legal system. It is a story not yet complete,
but in my feminist optimism I think it is one that signals the potential
of excluded voices transforming law."'
106. See supra note 101.
107. E.g., Meeting of the Feminist Legal Strategies Project, Washington, D.C. (Oct. 17-18,
1986); see also Schneider, supra note 5.
108. This intensified participation is due to 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982) (Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964), a federal civil rights law that now prohibits sex discrimination
in employment.
109. See, e.g., Taub, From ParentalLeaves to Nurturing Leaves, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 381 (1984-85); Address by Lisa Fenning, 14th Annual National Association for Law
Placement Conference, San Francisco, California (April 22, 1985) (report on Maternity
Benefits Survey); see also J. ABRAMSON & B. FRANKLIN, supra note 63, at 164-99.
110. See H.R. 2020, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. H 1941-42 (daily ed. April 4,
1985); see also Taub, supra note 110, at 402 n.98 (The Congressional Caucus for Women's

Issues, of which Congresswoman Schroeder is a member, considered the "Family Employment
Security Act" which includes disability and parental leave.).

11. The majority of European nations provide long-term leaves for women only. Sweden,
Denmark and France provide long-term leaves for both parents. See Taub, supra note 110, at
397 & n.80.
112. Many other stories could be told here of transformative legal efforts by feminist
lawyers. In the area of pornography, see American Booksellers v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th
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IV.

APPLICATIONS TO OTHER EXCLUSIONS

Let me turn now, briefly, to some speculations on how other
excluded voices might transform the legal theories and practices that
once pervaded the legal profession.
Imagine, if you will, what our constitution would have provided
for if black slaves had participated in its drafting 1' 3-for example, the
abolition of slavery, and the counting of each person as a whole person rather than as some fraction of a person.
Imagine as well, the question so eloquently posed by one of our
symposium participants, Patricia Williams:" 4 What would be the
legal meaning of family if the true families of mixed color that were
produced by our country's founders11 5 on the nation's plantations,
really had been taken into account? Taken one step further, think
how contemporary legal definitions of family might be broadened to
include the more nurturing extended family that is currently not fully
6
recognized by our legal system."
By focusing on the often excluded "lower classes," we can learn
more about the meaning of law through studying its penetration into
small claims courts and into disputes with employers and merchants,
and by analyzing the impact of obfuscating legal language." 17 How is
Cir. 1985), aff'd, 106 S. Ct. 1172 (1986) (reviewing an Indianapolis ordinance, passed through
the lobbying efforts of antipornography feminists, that granted civil rights remedies for the
pornographic depiction of women in sexually subordinate roles); MacKinnon, Not A Moral
Issue, 2 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 321 & n.1 (1984) (exposing pornography as the "graphic
sexually explicit subordination of women"). Feminist efforts, such as those of the
Reproductive Rights Project of the American Civil Liberites Union, helped secure a woman's
right to determine whether or not to bear a child. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973);
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). For a discussion of feminist efforts in the area of family
law, see L. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION (1985) (portraying the current status of
the law of domestic relations as a mixed story of success and failure); Marcus, Reflections on
the Significance of the Sex/Gender System: Divorce Law Reform in New York, 42 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 55 (1987); Menkel-Meadow, Portia,supra note 2, at 56-57 (discussing marital property
law reform). These are all examples of women lawyers working on women's legal issues in
such a way that the rules, doctrines and practices have had to be reconceptualized in order to
provide the needed results. For a more detailed discussion of some of these issues, see
Schneider, supra note 5.
113. See Bell, The Supreme Court, 1984 Term-Foreword." The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99
HARV. L. REV. 4 (1985).
114. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructing Rights, 22
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401 (1987).
115. F. BRODIE, THOMAS JEFFERSON 287-300 (1973).
116. See particularly the definitions of family used for eligibility in Aid to Families with
Dependent Children, Food Stamps, and Medicaid programs. Each program has different
requirements for eligibility, and each agency recognizes different extended family forms. See
also C. STACK, ALL OUR KIN 30-31 (1974).
117. This has been evident in law and society studies of lower, rather than appellate courts.
See, e.g., M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT (1979); see also Bumiller, supra note
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the law actually experienced by those who can't afford to mobilize it
and who more often experience it as a constraint and enforcement
mechanism rather than as an opportunity for crafting lucrative
transactions?
What might we learn about cooperation and caring from the
physically challenged and elderly that would focus us on the joys of
helping and interdependence and not on the individualistic achievement promoted by our laws and social structures?
And what are we already learning from the gay members of our
society about the infinite human variations in relationships that
demonstrate the impossibility of keeping to our neat legal categories?'" More urgently in recent times, what are we learning about the
inevitability of our interdependence as a result of the the modern
plague AIDS, which ultimately will affect us all?
At the risk of appearing to have lumped many excluded groups
together, when in fact they display enormous variations and diversity,
these exclusions tell us that our common exclusions may enable us to
see that there is a vision of equality that does not require sameness,
that there is glory in diversity and difference, and that there are ways
for the law to include, accommodate, and rejoice in the social and
cultural differences that both enrich our society as well as threaten to
divide it.

V.

THE DANGERS AND HOPES OF THE KNOWLEDGE
OF EXCLUSION

Let me conclude by offering some sobering and hopeful thoughts
about what the knowledge of exclusion offers us.
First, there is the danger of the reification of differences. I have
spoken of participation in the legal profession as one way that previously excluded peoples can transform the law. But what of the dangers of insularity and reinforcement of stereotypically conceived
differences? In terms of legal practice, what do we make of the
proliferation of self-interested bar associations? Women's, black,
Latin, Japanese, Filipino, and Korean bar associations all exist in Los
Angeles. I suspect there are comparable organizations in other cities.
This dispersion of differences occurs at a time when the elite bar
12, at 431-37 (discussing various reasons why many "excluded voices" do not utilize the legal
remedies that are available to them).
. 118. But see Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986) (This case unfortunately
represents a failure to recognize this variation in human relationships and may limit, at least
for awhile, the law's ability to hear from that particular "excluded voice.").
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associations, so influential in law and rulemaking, remain predominantly controlled by the white males of the elite, large law firms.
There is the danger of an inability to communicate across knowledge systems. Can the excluded talk to each other and to the included
or will we hear an impossible cacophony of voices? Will we find
enough commonality to agree on basic principles for our laws? Collective strategies of the excluded will be necessary to open the doors
ever wider. Can women talk to men, blacks to whites, Asians to
Latins? Where I come from, these are very real issues in which the
law is inevitably used in symbolic as well as real terms-to wit, the
California referendum to make English the official state language. 1 9
If the demographics of Miami are anything like Los Angeles we may
be witnesses to the exploitation of one underclass by another, creating
tensions as new excluded groups enter our society and displace or cre12 0
ate new lines of exclusion.
What is to be our model of inclusion? Should the romanticized
American "melting pot" be contrasted to the Canadian "mosaic '
imagery?
Is assimilation a desirable goal? In my study of women lawyers I
have been looking at a model of the incorporation of European immigrants into elite law firms.' 2 2 The models are varied. First Catholics,
then Jews, were admitted to elite law firms, but the most comprehensive study to date of the sociology of lawyers, Heinz & Laumann's
Chicago Lawyers, E3 demonstrates that the ethnic separation of lawyers begins in the tracking of law school and continues through legal
specializations and bar association memberships. Unlike the Jews and
Catholics, however, women and other excluded groups may not be
able to draw on wealthy same-group client bases to help create their
own law firms with enough success to rival and "merge" with more
restrictive forms of law practice. We have melted together to the
119. Official State Language Initiative ConstitutionalAmendment for the November 4,1986
GeneralElection, in CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET FOR THE NOVEMBER 4, 1986 GENERAL
ELECTION (proposed by Senator S.I. Hayakawa, Mr. William J. Orozco, and Mr. Stanley

Diamond).
120. In Los Angeles, there are stories of Korean shop owners locking their doors to black
consumers; whites who seek "English only" rules to stop Chinese and Hispanic businesses
from posting signs in other languages; and a general displacement of "older" minorities (blacks
and Hispanics) by "newer" groups who will work for less (Filipinos and Vietnamese) than
minimum wage in the workforce. See e.g., Hernandez, Tale of 2 Cultures, L.A. Times, May
18, 1986, § 2, at 1,col. 1;Dart, Korean Immigrants, Blacks Use Churches as Bridge to Ease
Tensions, L.A. Times, Nov. 9, 1985, at 4, col. 1;Banks, Korean Merchants, Black CustomersTensions Grow, L.A. Times, Apr. 15, 1985, § 2, at 1,col. 1.

121. A. MALCOLM, THE CANADIANS 66 (1985).
122. See generally J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE (1976).
123. J.HEINZ & E. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS (1983).
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extent that we all eat bagels, sushi, tacos, pizza, and dim sum, but we
live in a nation that probably still would not elect a Geraldine Ferraro, a Mario Cuomo, or a Jesse Jackson (integrated food, not
power!).
Let me also suggest that I fear total assimilation. The integration
that produces androgyny or marble cake without enough chocolate is
a potentially bland world that includes by blotting out differences and
by abstracting away the particularities.
As I have used feminism as my principal example of exclusion,
let me return to my opening theme, the epistemology of exclusion.
For those of us who have learned to rethink the world from a
woman's point of view-taking our own experiences seriously enough
to challenge the conventional order of things-these have been heady
'
and exciting times of "passionate learning." 124
What keeps me going
as a teacher and a lawyer is the realization that our knowledge structures are changing constantly and that law is a dynamic process. A
wise teacher taught me years ago that each time we learn something
new, we realize not that we know more but that we know less because
we recognize how much more there is to know. Such is the lesson of
the knowledge of exclusion-that each time we let in a new excluded
group, that each time we listen to a new way of knowing, we learn
more about the limits of our current way of seeing. Rather than being
threatened by new entrants into the legal profession and the law, we
should be grateful for the opportunity to learn that perhaps there are
new and other ways to do things. Most European countries have better social legislation than we do.' 2 5 Most Asian countries have less
litigation than we do.' 2 6 There is much we can learn.
In my view, the future of our society lies with the challenge of
whether we can learn to use the voices of the excluded to create innovative adaptations to these troubling times, and to learn that those
outside have much to tell us about ourselves and about the ways we
draw our lines. The inclusion of new voices in the legal profession is
124. M. BELENKY, supra note 75, at 141.
125. See S. HEWLETT, A LESSER LIFE 95-99, 127-29, 354-60, 420 n.73 (1986).
126. I say this at the risk of oversimplfying three issues that have been the subject of intense
scholarly debate. First, whether there is too much litigation in the United States. See, e.g.,
Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes.: What We Know and Don't Know (and Think
We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4 (1984).
Second, what are the reasons for the lower litigation rates in Japan. See, e.g., Haley, The Myth
of the Reluctant Litigant, 4 J. JAPANESE STUD. 359 (1978); Haley, The Politics of Informal
Justice. The Japanese Experience, 1922-1942, in 2 THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE 125
(R. Abel ed. 1982); Ramseyer, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant Redux, 14 J. JAPANESE
STUD. (1988). Finally, is the current state of affairs in both American and Japanese
litigation rates positive?
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one concrete way to make new voices in the law. For those of us who
are still excluded, the question is: Will you on the inside hear and,
more importantly, will you really listen to what we have to give?

